Water Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 14

9-1-2014

Aransas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
Keith Tart

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Keith Tart, Court Report, Aransas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), 18 U. Denv.
Water L. Rev. 188 (2014).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Aransas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding
(i) The Aransas Project had standing to bring action under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"); (ii) the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining
to abstain from exercising federal jurisdiction; (iii) the district court's finding that
twenty-three endangered whooping cranes died was not clearly erroneous; (iv)
the district court erred in excluding the admission of defendants' survey after
trial, but the error was harmless because the district court concluded the survey
lacked importance; (v) the district court's application of the incorrect test for
causation was clear error; and (vi) the district court failed to find that a future
harm was "certainly impending," meaning the grant of an injunction was an
abuse of discretion).
The Aransas National Wildlife Refuge ("Refuge") sits adjacent to San Antonio Bay in Texas. The San Antonio and Guadalupe Rivers provide freshwater inflows to this area, also known as the Guadalupe Estuary. The Refuge is
the winter home of the Aransas-Wood Buffalo ("AWB") whooping crane flock,
consisting of approximately three hundred birds. The freshwater inflows in the
Guadalupe Estuary provide critical habitat for the flock. Texas owns the surface
waters of the state and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
("TCEQ") administers the capture and use of those waters through its permitting and regulatory powers.
During the winter of 2008-2009, the Refuge's biologist recovered four
crane carcasses and determined another nineteen missing cranes had died, a
claimed loss of twenty-three cranes. Over the previous seventy years, authorities
recorded the deaths of only twenty cranes. The whooping crane is an endangered species under the ESA. After the media publicized the crane deaths, a
group of concerned citizens formed The Aransas Project ("TAP"), a non-profit
dedicated to protecting the whooping cranes' habitat. TAP sued TCEQ, pursuant to the ESA's citizen suit provision, alleging that TCEQ's actions and omissions in managing the waters of the Guadalupe and San Antonio River Systems
had harmed the flock and ultimately caused the death of twenty-three cranes.
TAP sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would ensure sufficient water
resources for the AWB flock.
TAP alleged a lengthy chain of events leading to liability: (i) TCEQ's permitting and regulatory practices significantly reduced the amount of freshwater
in the estuary; (ii) the reduction in available freshwater increased salinity in the
estuary which decreased available food supplies; (iii) the reduction in available

Issue 1

COURTREPORTS

food led to emaciation and predation among the cranes; (iv) these conditions
combined to cause the deaths of twenty-three cranes in the winter of 20082009; and (v)these deaths constituted illegal "takings" under the ESA.
Before trial, the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas ("district court") granted motions to intervene for the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, the Texas Chemical Council, and the San Antonio River Authority ("intervenor defendants"). The district court conducted an eight-day bench trial,
took testimony from nearly thirty witnesses, and issued a 124-page opinion concluding that TCEQ's permitting effected a taking under the ESA. The district
court enjoined TCEQ from issuing any new permits, unless required for the
public's continued health and safety, until the agency applied to the US Fish
and Wildlife Service ("FWS") for an Incidental Take Permit ("ITP"). ITPs
allow an exception to the ESA's prohibition on both purposeful and incidental
harm and harassment of endangered species. ITPs require the development
of a "Habitat Conservation Plan" to "minimize and mitigate" the impacts of
incidental takings. TCEQ and the intervenor defendants appealed.
The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("court") first addressed
whether TAP had standing. On appeal, WDEQ challenged TAP's standing
for the first time. The court spent little time addressing the issue, concluding
that TAP's allegations satisfied federal requirements for standing because TAP
alleged an injury (crane deaths), a theory of causation (regulatory actions resulted in reduced water flows), and future deaths attributable to an ESA violation (continued crane deaths if not corrected).
The court then discussed whether the district court erred by not abstaining
from exercising federal jurisdiction. While the Court reviews an abstention decision under an abuse of discretion standard, it reviews de novo whether the
elements of abstention were satisfied. Courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a particular case, or abstain, if exercising jurisdiction would be prejudicial to the public interest-including cases involving basic issues of state policy
that the federal courts should avoid. The court analyzed five factors pursuant
to the Burfordabstention doctrine: (i) whether the cause of action arises under
federal law; (ii) whether the case requires inquiry into unsettled issues of state
law or into local facts; (iii) the importance of the state interest involved; (iv) the
state's need for a coherent policy in that area; and (v) the presence of a special
state forum for judicial review.
The court found that factors one, two, and five weighed against abstention
The ESA is a federal law with no "skein of state law" to untangle before resolving the federal case, and neither the TCEQ nor the Texas state courts had authority to provide a remedy. With respect to remedy, the court found that
(i) the Texas Water Code expressly prohibited granting water rights for environmental reasons; (ii) TCEQ was likely prohibited from providing water for
cranes during an emergency (e.g., a drought); and (iii) Texas law provided no
cause of action under which TAP could sue TCEQ in state court. The court
considered factor three-the importance of the state interest involved-a tossup.
Although Texas had a strong interest in managing its natural resources, especially water, the federal interest in endangered species was equally strong. The
only factor the court found to weigh in favor of abstention was number four, the
state's need for a coherent policy in the. management of its finite natural re-
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sources. Here, TCEQ administered the Texas Water Code pursuant to a regulatory scheme that balances water rights and stakeholder interests. The court
concluded that "[flederal intervention could easily upset that delicate balancing." After balancing all five factors, the court concluded the federal courts
could avoid entanglement in Texas state law by "treading carefully." Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abstain.
The court then turned its attention to the district courts' findings of fact and
its imposition of liability upon the state defendants. Chief among its findings of
fact, the district court, relying mainly on the Refuge biologists' testimony, concluded that twenty-three whooping cranes died during the winter of 2008-2009
in the Refuge. The biologist made this determination by conducting fly-overs
of the Refuge. He noticed nineteen known birds missing from their usual territorial positions. Additionally, he found four crane carcasses. Because postmortem examinations of two of these birds indicated emaciation as a cause of
death, the biologist concluded that twenty-three cranes died during the winter
of 2008-2009. He opined that lower water levels adversely impacted the flock's
habitat. Despite the district court's finding that the biologist's opinions were
reliable, the court noted many problems with the methods and data used to
conclude that twenty-three cranes had died. Despite this, the court concluded
that the district court's finding that twenty-three cranes had died was not clearly
erroneous.
The ultimate issue confronting the court was whether TCEQ's issuance of
permits to take water from the Guadalupe and San Antonio Rivers was the
proximate cause of the twenty-three whooping crane deaths during the winter
of 2008-2009. In order to affix liability for a taking under the ESA, the effect
of the defendant's actions must be foreseeable-the ESA does not impose strict
liability. The court noted that causation requires more than mere fortuity; it
cannot rest upon "remote actors in a vast and complex ecosystem." The court
emphasized that the foreseeability requirement acts as a limitation upon liability
where, even if the links in the chain of causation can be connected, at some
point liability becomes too remote.
The court cited several cases where a sufficiently close connection existed
between certain regulatory acts and violations of the ESA to satisfy the foreseeability test. In one case, the US Forest Service permitted the removal of an
excessive number of trees that were home for red cockaded woodpeckers. In
another case, right whales were "taken" because a state agency authorized fisherman to use gillnets and lobster traps in certain areas, and these devices were
known to cause harm to the whales. In each of these cases, the government
agency was held liable for a "direct" taking under the ESA.
In this case, the court took issue with the district court's finding that "Ipiroximate causation exists where a defendant government agency authorized the activity that caused the take." The court found the district court's opinion lacking
in findings of fact sufficient to show causation and prove liability under the ESA,
and chastised the district court for finding causation "without even mentioning
concepts of remoteness, attenuation, foreseeability, or the natural and probable
consequences of actions." Moreover, the court found the district court expressly disregarded other circumstances that clearly weighed against a finding of
causation. Chief among these other circumstances was a drought during the
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winter of 2008-2009 that experts considered an "outlier" among Texas' cyclical
drought conditions. Other variables included constantly changing weather,
tides, and temperature, as well as varying degrees of water use by permittees.
Ultimately, the court concluded that a "fortuitous confluence" of "multiple, natural, independent, unpredictable and interrelated forces" caused the deaths of
the whooping cranes in the Refuge. Calling this set of circumstances "the essence of unforeseeability," the court found causation lacking as a matter of law
and vacated the district court's finding of liability against the state defendants.
Last, the court addressed the district court's grant of an injunction. The
court held the district court erred in three ways in granting injunctive relief.
First, the district court improperly based injunctive relief upon an improper
proximate cause analysis. Hence, the court's vacation of the state defendants'
liability "commanded" the quashing of the injunction. Second, assuming arguendo that TCEQ's actions did proximately cause the crane deaths, the district
court erred in applying a "relaxed" standard for granting injunctions under the
ESA. Third, the court held that the district court erred in finding a real and
immediate threat of future injury to the cranes.
The district court had determined that a "relaxed" standard existed for
granting injunctions under the ESA. The court noted that, while it is true that
the balance of equities favor protecting wildlife under the ESA, an injunction
still requires a showing of "certainly impending" future harm. Additionally, the
court found that even if the district court had applied the correct standard, it
did not make sufficient factual findings to support that conclusion. The court
noted that, after 2008-2009, substantial evidence existed to the contrary, including no evidence of unusual deaths, no evidence of dangerous salinity levels, no
evidence of deficient blue crabs or woliberries, no evidence of lack of a drinking
water shortage in the Refuge, and no evidence of emaciated birds or extreme
behavioral patterns. The court concluded that "[i]njunctive relief for the indefinite future cannot be predicated on the unique events of one year without proof
of their likely, imminent replication."
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's finding that TCEQ
caused the whooping crane deaths and denied TAP's request for injunctive relief.
Keith Tart
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
California exrel. Imperial Cnty. Air Pollution Control Dist. v. U.S. Dep't
of Interior, 767 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing
to sue and that the Department of Interior's environmental impact statement
on the effects of water transfer agreements on the Salton Sea in southern California did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act or the Clean Air
Act).
Plaintiffs Imperial County and the Imperial County Air Pollution Control
District ("Imperial") sued the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary"), claiming
that the Secretary's environmental impact statement ("EIS") did not comply
with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") or the Clean Air Act
("CAA"). Several California water districts, parties to the proposed transfer

